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In the current challenging economic environment, non-profit organizations (NPOs) are exposed to an array of risks 
and some of these risks are unique due to the characteristics of the organizations.  Understanding and managing these 
risks are crucial in ensuring sustainability of the NPOs and the responsibility lies with the board. However, risks 
management and disclosure of risks in NPOs is less well developed relative to for profit organizations and this may 
affect boards’ role in enhancing risk management practices of these organizations. As such, this study aims to examine 
the relationships between certain board characteristics: board competencies, network ties and risk management 
disclosure practices in NPOs. Information on these variables are obtained from content analysis of annual reports 
and Financial Information Forms of 219 NPOs registered with Companies Commission of Malaysia for the financial 
period 2011. Results of this study reveal that the overall extent of risk management disclosure practices is at a 
moderate level. In addition, only board competencies are significantly positively related to the extent of risk 
management disclosure practices while network ties are not. This infers that some board members acknowledge the 
importance of being engaged in risk management decision. However, lack of specific guide on risk management in 
NPOs may reduce the motivation of some board members to do so. The guidelines and relevant trainings to board 
members provided by relevant authorities may increase the understanding of key risks and management of these risks 
as part of good governance in NPOs. 
 





on-profit organizations (NPOs) are generally defined as societies, associations, charities, and other 
voluntary organizations that are formed not for making profits but rather to provide social services 
such as healthcare, social care, transport and waste collection. Nevertheless, NPOs are equally 
exposed to an array of risks such as funding risks, reputational risks and capacity risks that can subsequently have a 
negative impact on the sustainability of their organisations. Some of these risks are unique due to the characteristics 
of the NPOs (CBIZ, 2012), such as types of funding, non-profit maximization and the use of volunteers. Regardless 
of the types of risks, NPOs can mitigate these risks if there is an anticipated plan of risk management (Laroche & 
Corbette, 2010, Thornton, 2013). However, for effective risks management, it is crucial to identify the risks, analyze 
the risks identified and monitor the risk management process.  
 
Identification and management of risks are integral to effective governance in any NPOs. In this context, the ultimate 
responsibility lies with the board of directors of the NPOs. The availability of effective risk management in NPOs 
allows the board to concentrate on strategic planning and other matters to ensure long term sustainability of their 
organizations in delivering their social objectives. This implies that effective boards contribute to good governance 
practices in NPOs. The composition of an effective board should include a variety of personalities, with a range of 
skills and experience to enable them to discharge their duties and responsibilities effectively (Ansari, 2010). For 
example, the resource dependence theory (RDT) argues that board members with professional backgrounds are more 
capable to assist the NPOs in understanding and analyzing the key risks the NPOs is exposed to. In addition to the 
N 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – September/October 2016 Volume 32, Number 5 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1320 The Clute Institute 
characteristic of the board members, it is equally important for regulators to provide some guidance on risk 
management in NPOs. To date, risks management as well as disclosure of risks in NPOs is less well developed relative 
to for profit organizations. Risks reporting through the annual reports of NPOs in particular, allow the NPOs to 
communicate to their relevant stakeholders and in turn gain continuous support for their missions. However, there is 
little empirical evidence on the relationship between board characteristics and the extent of risk reporting in annual 
reports of NPOs. Hence, this study aims to examine the relationships between certain board characteristics, board 
competencies and network ties, and the extent of risk management disclosure practices in NPOs.     
 
This paper will proceed with the background of NPOs in Malaysia. It will then review the literature on the relationships 
between board competencies, network ties and risk management disclosure practices from the resource dependence 
theory perspective. Hypotheses will be developed from these reviews. Finally, this paper will proceed to the empirical 
stage of variable measurement, sampling, data analysis, discussion of results, limitations and suggestions for future 
research.    
 
NPO SECTOR IN MALAYSIA  
 
Generally, there are two categories of NPOs in Malaysia. First, NPOs with revenue of less than RM1 million are 
required to register with the Registry of Societies (ROS) and must comply with the Societies Act 1966. Second, NPOs 
with revenue of more than RM1 million can be registered as companies limited by guarantee (CLBGs) with the 
Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM) and must comply with the Companies Act 1965.  
 
CLBGs are formed as public limited companies with the word “BHD” or without the word “BHD”. The company 
may be exempted from using the word “BHD” if they get approval from the Minister. NPOs can use the word 
foundation, institute, academy, corporation, alliance, chamber, council, federal, fund, memorial at the centre or at the 
start or end of its name. In addition, CLBGs are also bound by certain specific requirements: engaged in activities 
limited to the above categories; any surplus arising from promoting its objects will not be distributed as dividends to 
their members; board members are not entitled to remuneration and the Minister-in-charge may from time to time 
impose additional requirements.  
 
NPOs that are registered with CCM have the same statutory obligations as other companies under the Companies Act 
1965. There are also governance requirements to be complied by the NPOs such as the requirement of boards in terms 
of appointment and numbers of boards, requirement to hold annual general meeting in addition to other meetings and 
a duty to ensure the appointment of a company secretary and a registered office. NPOs are required to lodge the 
relevant information of the company such as annual returns, audited accounts, change of directors, change of 
shareholders, change of business activities and change of company status with the CCM on a timely basis. As at 31 
December 2011, a total of 1,587 CLBG were registered with CCM.  
 
While NPOs registered with CCM are more regulated in terms of reporting, there is no specific regulation or 
accounting standard for NPOs under ROS. These NPOs are however encouraged to comply with the International 
Financial Reporting Standards issued by International Accounting Standard Board and adopted by the Malaysian 
Accounting Standard Board or reporting standards applicable for private entities in the preparation and presentation 
of their financial statements (Arshad et.al 2013). Even though the NPOs registered with CCM are more regulated, the 
regulations are not specific to NPOs, including requirements or guidelines for risk management.   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND GENERATION OF HYPOTHESES 
 
Resource Dependence Theory, Board Composition and Risk Management Disclosure Practices 
 
The annual reports provide a useful mechanism for NPOs to report the key risks they are exposed to and reviewed by 
the board and the procedures or systems implemented to manage them. This is more critical in the current challenging 
economic environment for NPOs to communicate their risk management to the relevant stakeholders in sustaining and 
building greater trust. In the context of the RDT perspective (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), it is important that board of 
directors in NPOs understand the importance of being engaged in decisions on key risks so that they can reduce 
environmental uncertainty and dependence. However, the current literature on risk management in NPOs provide little 
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evidence with regards to the characteristics of board members and the extent of risk management disclosure practices 
in annual reports of the NPOs. The findings on this strand of research can facilitate policy makers and relevant 
authorities in providing the relevant training to board members and guidelines on risk management in NPOs. In filling 
this gap, this study focuses on two main board characteristics: board competencies in terms of board efficiency and 
board with leadership support and commitment and board network ties in terms of board with political connection and 
board with professional affiliation. 
 
Board Competencies and Risk Management Disclosure Practices 
 
Board competencies are generally associated with the human capital possessed by the board members. Examples of 
human capital are commitment, knowledge, skills, motivation and loyalty. These various skills can be translated into 
enhancement of board efficiency. Previous studies provide empirical evidence that human capital efficiency have 
positive influence on various forms of organisational strategies, i.e. the efficiency of the organisation; the value 
creation of the organisation; the competitive advantage as well as performance (e.g. Barney, 1991; O’Donnell et al., 
2009). This implies that human capital possesses by board members enhance their ability to take advantage of market 
opportunities as well as to reduce the effect of potential threats. In the context of risk management, this group of board 
members are more likely to acknowledge the importance of managing risk and reporting the relevant information in 
the annual reports. Following this argument, the following hypothesis is developed: 
 
H1: Board efficiency is significantly positively related to the extent of risk management disclosure practices. 
 
One of the above component of human capital possess by the board is commitment. In the current economic 
environment, NPOs face many challenges and risks in achieving their mission and meeting their stakeholders’ 
expectations. The commitment and support from the leaders are important in ensuring their mission is achievable. The 
presence of this commitment could be shown through effective leadership.  In addition, the strong commitment and 
support of corporate leaders could be presented through external channel by documenting the mission and vision of 
the organizations (D’Amato & Roome, 2009). The communication of risk management objectives and strategies 
between the top management and their stakeholders are also a signal that top management shows their commitment 
towards safeguarding their stakeholders’ interest (Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003; Othman & Ali, 2012). In this study, 
board with leadership support and commitment are expected to have a positive impact on the voluntary risk 
information disclosure in the NPOs. Based on this reason, the following hypothesis has been developed: 
 
H2: Board with leadership support and commitment is significantly positively related to the extent of risk management 
disclosure practices. 
 
Board Network Ties and Risk Management Disclosure Practices 
 
Pfeffer & Slancik, (1978) proposed that board functions as a resource to NPOs and provide an important link between 
the organization and their stakeholders. This in turn suggests that it is important that the organisation develops and 
maintains healthy relationships with the various stakeholders (Mwenja & Lewis, 2009). In the current complex 
economic environment, risks evolve continuously and the board needs to communicate that the organisation has a 
sound management of risk. Board members with political connection are visible members of the society and they are 
more likely to have the motivation to potray that their organisation has good risk management practices. Concurrently, 
NPOs with politically connected board members are also more likely to disclose their risk management practices as 
past studies provide evidence that these board members are associated with various value creations (e.g. Carpenter & 
Westphal, 2001, Hasnan, Rahman & Mahenthiran, 2013). For example, Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2009) found that 
the appointment of directors with political connection affect shareholders’ value. Following this argument, the 
following hypothesis is developed: 
 
H3: Board with political connection is significantly positively related to the extent of risk management disclosure 
practices. 
 
In addition to board members with political connection, board members with professional backgrounds are also visible 
members of the society. Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) argue that this can be associated with their concerned to 
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maintain and enhance their professional reputation. They are also obliged to comply with their professional 
commitments and are more motivated to contribute positively to the specific environmental needs facing the 
organizations (Carcello, Hermanson, Neal, & Riley Jr., 2002). The capability of the board members with professional 
backgrounds also allows them to assist the NPOs in analyzing and understanding the complex environment under 
which the NPOs operate (Mwenja & Lewis, 2009). One aspect of such complexity is related to managing 
organizational responsiveness to the key risks faced by the organization. Hence, the following hypothesis is developed: 
 





Sample and Data Collection 
 
The sample consists of 219 CLBGs registered with the CCM and having total assets of at least RM500,000 for the 
financial year 2011. NPOs in Malaysia are classified under 13 categories and the sample size of this study was derived 
from a random selection of those categories.The research approach involves content analysis of annual reports and 
Financial Information Form (BMK). Annual reports contain information on directors, financial information as well as 
their program activities whereas the BMK provide information on the detail annual expenditure. Content analysis has 
been widely employed in prior studies to measure voluntary and mandatory disclosures in annual reports (e.g. 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; O’Donovan, 2002; Clemens & Douglas et al., 2006).  
 
Extent of Risk Management Disclosure Practices 
 
The dependent variable used in this study is risk management and has been measured by using self-constructed Risk 
Disclosure Index (RDI). The development of the RDI is guided by the review of prior studies relevant to risk disclosure 
in NPOs and related authorities (e.g. Laroche & Corbett, 2010; Thornton, 2013). RDI is measured by comparing the 
contents of each annual report that have been marked as ‘1’ if the item in the RDI has been disclosed and ‘0’ for 
otherwise.  
 
The items in the RDI were selected based on previous studies and applicability to the Malaysian non-profit 
environment. The preliminary list presented six types of risks: governance risks, operational risks, compliance risks, 
financial risks, reputational risks and money laundering risks. Based on this preliminary content analysis, a review of 
the categories and disclosure items was made and minor modifications were made to the items of disclosure. In 
addition, items related to money laundering risks were dropped from the RDI.  
 
The total score of RDI represents the number of points scored by each organization and it is an ordinal measure of the 
extent of disclosure for each organization. The score is additive and unweighted. Unweighted scores are used in this 
study by assuming each item disclosed is of equal importance to each stakeholder to make their decisions. The degree 
of importance is generally based on rankings obtained from pooled opinions of a group of subjects (e.g. APG 
assessment team or any preferred user group). The subjective judgments are affected in assigning the weights and 
reduces the objectivity of the index as a measure of the extent of disclosure (Gray et al.,1995). Furthermore, Chow & 
Wong-Boren (1987) suggest that the use of weighted or weighted disclosure index is interchangeable because they 
find almost equivalent results using either one of the index. It is also supported by prior studies that employed and 
adopted the same approach on disclosures (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Gray et al., 1995). For each NPO, the disclosure 
index is calculated as a ratio of the actual score awarded to NPOs divided by the maximum potential score awarded 
to those NPOs. The score is calculated as follows: 
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𝑅𝐷𝐼 = 𝑋&'()&*+𝑛'  
 
Where nj= number of items expected for jth  organisation,  
 
nj  is ≤  25, 
 
Xi j= 1 if ithitem disclosed and  
 
0 if ith item not disclosed, 
 
So that 0 ≤ Ij≥ 1 
 
MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES 
 
There are four independent variables in this study: board competencies as measured by board efficiency, board with 
leadership support and commitment, board with network ties as measured by political connection and board with 
professional affiliations. In addition to the identified independent variables, this study also includes one organizational 
characteristic identified in prior research as a determinant of management disclosure decision (e.g. Gray et al., 1995; 
Haniffa & Cooke, 2005) as control variable. This variable is size. The definition and measurement of variables used 
in this study are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Definition and Variables Measurement 
Variable Acronym Definition Measurement 
RISK_MGT Risk Management Disclosure Practice Self-constructed risk disclosure index (RDI). 
BOD_EFFCY Board Efficiency Total revenue to total number of board members. 
BOD_COMM Board with leader support and 
commitment 
Dichotomous score of 1 if there is additional Risk 
Management section being reported; 0if otherwise 
BOD_POLCONN Board with political connection Percentage of board members with political 
connections to total number of board members. 
BOD_PROF Board with professional affiliations Percentage of board members with professional 
affiliations to total number of board members. 
ORG_SIZE Size of Organization Total Assets. 
 
 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics on the Risk Management Disclosure Practices 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics on Risk Management Disclosure Index 
 N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
RISK_MGT (%) 219 0.50 0.26 0.76 0.4961 0.3610 
RISK_MGT represents score in Risk Disclosure Index 
 
Table 2 reported the descriptive statistics on the dependent variable of RDI. From the 219 sample size selected, the 
mean of RDI was 0.4961. This indicates that the overall level of risks disclosure is still at a moderate level. The mean 
values range from a minimum of 0.50 to a maximum value of 0.76.  
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics on the Overall Extent of Risk Disclosures 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Gov_R 219 0.00 0.33 0.3285 0.0223 
Ope_R 219 0.00 1.00 0.2679 0.2258 
Comp_R 219 0.33 0.67 0.5644 0.1576 
Fin_R 219 0.25 1.00 0.7226 0.2726 
Rep_R 219 0.40 0.80 0.5973 0.1464 
Valid N (listwise) 219   0.4961  
Legend: Gov_R represents of Governance Risk, Ope_R represents  Operational Risk, Comp_R represents   
Compliance Risk, Fin_R represents  Financial Risk, Rep_R represents  Reputational Risk  
 
Table 3 reported the descriptive statistics on the five types of risks included in RDI. The results indicate the highest 
mean of the sample is 72.26% for financial risk and the lowest disclosure score was 26.79% for operational risks. The 
results also indicate that more than 50% of the disclosure items reported in the annual reports emphasized on the 
financial, reputational and compliance risks rather than on governance and operational risks.  
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables and Control Variable 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
BOD_EFFCY(RM) 219 0.00 36,116,392.40 7.11194.48 2.650027.94 
BOD_COMM 219 0.00 1.00 0.6667 0.4724 
BOD_POLCONN (%) 219 0.00 1.00 0.4429 0.3610 
BOD_PROF (%) 219 0.00 0.83 0.1438 0.1969 
ORG_SIZE (RM) 219 9208.00 1.042947386.00 2.4006046.70 1.04212814.8 
Valid N (listwise) 219     
Legend: BOD_EFFCY refers to Board Efficiency, BOD_POLCONN refers to Board with Political Connection, BOD_PROF refers to Board with 
Professional Affiliation, BOD_COMM refers to Board with Leader support and commitment, ORG_SIZE refers to organisation size 
 
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for the independent variables of board efficiency, board with leadership support 
and commitment, board with political connection, board with professional affiliation and control variable which is the 
organization size. Table 4 reported that the mean value for board efficiency is RM7.11194.48 with a minimum value 
of RM0.00 to a maximum of RM36,116,392.40. This indicates that some NPOs generate fairly large amount of 
revenue. Table 4 also reported that some NPOs have 100% board members with political connection while others have 
100% board with leadership support and commitment. The results also indicated that some NPOs have 83% board 
with professional affiliation. Finally, Table 4 reported some NPOs are very small with revenue of RM9208.00 to fairly 




The multivariate test was also conducted to test the hypotheses developed for this study by using multiple regression 
analysis. The hypothesized relationships are modeled as follows. 
 
RISK MANAGEMENT = β0 + β1BOD_EFFCY + β2BOD_COMM + β3BOD_POLCONN + 
β4BOD_PROF + β6ORG_SIZE + Σt 
 
The result of multiple regression analysis in Table 5 reported that the adjusted R2 is 0.474 which indicates 47.40% of 
the portion of the total variation in the dependent variable could be explained by variation in the independent variables 
of the board competency and organization size of the study.  
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Table 5. Multiple Regression Results for Factors Affecting the Level of Accountability 
Dependent Variable RISK_MGT 
R square  .486  
Adjusted R square  .474  
F  40.225  
Sig  .000  
Model Beta t Sig. 
(Constant)  .698 .486 
BOD_EFFCY (RM) .184 3.123 .002*** 
BOD_POLCONN (%) -.068 -1.246 -.214 
BOD_PROF (%)  -.021 -.394 .694 
BOD_COMM (DS) .621 12.572 .000*** 
ORG_SIZE (LOG TA) .111 1.873 .062* 
*Significant at 10% level (1-tailed test); **Significant at 5% level (1-tailed test);    
***Significant at 1% level (1-tailed test.) 
Legend: BOD_EFFCY refers to Board Efficiency, BOD_POLCONN refers to Board with Political 
Connection, BOD_PROF refers to Board with Professional Affiliation, BOD_COMM refers to Board with  
Leader support and commitment, ORG_SIZE refers to organization size. 
 
H1 predicts that Board Efficiency is positively significantly related to the extent of RDI and the results supported the 
hypothesis. Therefore, H1 is accepted. These results suggest that board efficiency is a vital resource to NPOs in the 
implementation of risk management disclosure practices. These board members are more likely to monitor the 
strategic challenges faced by the organization including risk and uncertainty. This in turn increases the motivation of 
board members with relevant efficiency to implement proactive plan through risk reporting for mitigating risks and 
managing relationships with stakeholders.  
 
With regards to Board with Leadership Support and Commitment, results in Table 5 revealed a positive relationship 
between board commitment and RDI. Thus, H2 is accepted. This is consistent with past studies where communication 
of risk management objectives and strategies between the top management and their stakeholders are a signal that top 
management shows their commitment towards safeguarding their stakeholders’ interest (Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003; 
S. Othman, 2011). Overall, the results of both HI and H2 indicate board competencies are significantly positively 
related to the extent of RDI.  
 
In contrast, Table 5 reported an insignificant relationship between Board with Political Connections and RDI. H3 is 
therefore rejected. This result indicates that network ties of board through political connection do not influence the 
extent of RDI. Results in Table 5 also revealed an insignificant relationship between Board with Professional 
Affiliation and RDI. Hence, H4 is therefore rejected. While these two types of board members are expected to be 
associated with higher disclosure of risk management practice, the absence of more specific guidelines on risk 
management for NPOs may reduce their motivation to do so. If such guidelines exist, they are more likely to have the 
motivation to potray that their organisation has good risk management practices in meeting the expectations of the 
society and other stakeholders.  
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This study provides empirical findings on risk management disclosure practices for a sample size of 219 NPOs. 
Overall, the results found that board efficiency and board with leadership support and commitment are significantly 
related to RDI. However, board with political connections and professional affiliation indicate insignificant results to 
RDI. These findings indicate that some board members acknowledge the importance of being engaged in risk 
management decision. However, lack of specific guide on risk management in NPOs may reduce the motivation of 
some board members to do so. The guidelines and relevant trainings to board members provided by relevant authorities 
may increase the understanding of key risks and management of these risks as part of good governance in NPOs. 
 
However, there are some limitations in this study. Firstly, this study focuses on risk information disclose in the annual 
reports. Future studies may use questionnaires distributed to NPOs boards and members to get a clearer understanding 
of risk management and disclosures. Secondly, the study was only conducted for the year of 2011 and the conclusion 
could not be generalized. Future research can extend this study by including several accounting periods. Finally, this 
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study only focuses on four independent variables. Other variables such as board meetings, board interlocking, board 
duality is not included and may give an effect to the extent of risk management disclosure practices of NPOs. Despite 
these limitations, this study provides useful insights in understanding the relationships between various board 
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